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Abstract
Background: In the complex domain of medical decision making, reasoning under uncertainty can
benefit from supporting tools. Automated decision support tools often build upon mathematical
models, such as Bayesian networks. These networks require probabilities which often have to be
assessed by experts in the domain of application. Probability response scales can be used to support
the assessment process. We compare assessments obtained with different types of response scale.
Methods: General practitioners (GPs) gave assessments on and preferences for three different
probability response scales: a numerical scale, a scale with only verbal labels, and a combined verbal-
numerical scale we had designed ourselves. Standard analyses of variance were performed.
Results: No differences in assessments over the three response scales were found. Preferences
for type of scale differed: the less experienced GPs preferred the verbal scale, the most
experienced preferred the numerical scale, with the groups in between having a preference for the
combined verbal-numerical scale.
Conclusion: We conclude that all three response scales are equally suitable for supporting
probability assessment. The combined verbal-numerical scale is a good choice for aiding the
process, since it offers numerical labels to those who prefer numbers and verbal labels to those
who prefer words, and accommodates both more and less experienced professionals.
Background
Reasoning under uncertainty is common practice in the
medical field. Diagnoses and prognoses are always made
in the face of uncertainty, for example about the exact
pathogenic processes underlying some observed relation
between symptom and disease. In addition, most diag-
nostic tests are not 100% reliable, resulting in uncertainty
as to the true presence or absence of the disease tested for.
On top of that, the effects of treatment may differ per
patient and cannot be predicted with certainty. Clinical
decision making is, in short, a complex task which could
benefit from supporting tools.
Support may for example be provided by the increasingly
recommended 'threshold approach' [1]. This approach
defines two thresholds. The first threshold indicates the
decision boundary between no treatment and testing. If
the clinician's estimate of the probability of the presence
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of a disease falls below this threshold, no treatment is
given. The second threshold is the boundary between test-
ing and treating. Probability estimates of the presence of a
disease which fall between these two thresholds dictate
performing additional diagnostic tests, and estimates
which are above the second threshold indicate that treat-
ment should be started right away. The approach is only
valid if the physician's estimate is a true probability, rea-
sonably accurate and unbiased. It is well-known, how-
ever, that humans are poor probability estimators [2] and
that physicians are no exception [3,4]. This observation
can be partially explained by 'support theory' [5], which is
based on the idea that subjective probabilities are not true
probabilities of events in a mathematical sense, but that
they reflect how much support people have for different
descriptions of the events. As a result, subjective probabil-
ity estimates have been shown to suffer from unpacking
effects and subadditivity. The typical unpacking effect
refers to the phenomenon that when an hypothesis is
unpacked into a number of more detailed hypotheses,
then the sum of the probabilities assigned to the more
detailed descriptions exceeds the probability estimated for
the 'packed' hypothesis. When the sum of the probabili-
ties assigned to all hypotheses exceeds a 100%, this over-
estimation of the true probabilities is called subadditivity.
It has been shown that probability estimates provided by
physicians are also prone to the unpacking effect [6,7],
which "questions the applicability of the threshold
approach if the physicians are not given guidance, explicit
tools and formal training in probability estimation" ([7],
p. 763).
Different methods are available to support experts in
assessing probability judgments (for an overview see e.g.
[8-10]). However, in constructing a Bayesian network as
part of a decision support system to aid physicians in
selecting a suitable treatment for patients with oesopha-
geal cancer, we found that none of the standard probabil-
ity elicitation methods seemed to work (cf. below:
Context). We therefore designed our own method [11]. A
major ingredient of this method is the use of one proba-
bility scale with both verbal and numerical labels (see Fig-
ure 1a below), which is similar to but differs from
methods proposed by others (e.g. [12]), who provide
both a verbal and a numerical scale but separately. The
method, including the double scale, has since been used
for eliciting the required probabilities in a number of real-
istic applications of decision support systems, both in the
medical field [11,13,14] as well as in other domains
[15,16], yet a more extensive validation of the scale is still
called for. In a previous between-subject study, we evalu-
ated our verbal-numerical probability scale with students
as subjects, comparing the ease of use of and accuracy of
assessments on our verbal-numerical scale against a
purely numerical scale [17]. In the study reported in the
current paper, we had physicians as subjects (general prac-
titioners (GPs)), and we included a scale with only verbal
labels. We were interested in: their preferences in use of
the three scales, differences in the assessments, confidence
in assessments with the three scales, and whether or not
the use of a response scale affected the unpacking effect
described above.
History of the verbal-numerical probability scale
Our personal experiences with eliciting probabilities
using our verbal-numerical probability scale were very
good [11]. However, anyone who considers using our
double scale, should be familiar with its underlying ideas.
For this reason we review its design, initial use and first
evaluation.
Context
The verbal-numerical probability scale was designed as
part of a probability elicitation method for the fast assess-
ment of 4000 point probabilities required for the con-
struction of a real-life Bayesian network in the domain of
oesophageal cancer (for details on the network and its
construction we refer to [11]). Bayesian networks are
mathematical models that capture a joint probability dis-
tribution over a set of variables that are relevant in the
domain of application [18], and are popular in the medi-
cal domain (see e.g. [19-22]). Bayesian networks allow for
the computation of any prior or posterior probability of
interest, using efficient algorithms that basically imple-
ment Bayes' rule.
The numerical probabilities required for a network's spec-
ification can be easily established from a very large, rich
and reliable data set. However, such data sets are rare and
often do not allow the reliable assessment of the typically
The probability scales: The verbal-numerical (a), the verbal  (b) and the numerical (c) probability scale Figure 1
The probability scales: The verbal-numerical (a), the verbal 
(b) and the numerical (c) probability scale.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:13 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/13
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large number of specific probabilities that are required. As
a result, some or all of the probabilities will have to be
assessed by experts in the domain of application [23],
something they are often reluctant to do because they do
not feel familiar enough with the concept of probability
or they find it difficult to attach a number to their beliefs
[24]. This is exactly the problem we ran into, and none of
the standard elicitation methods could help us overcome
it. Indirect methods, such as lotteries, proved to be too
complex and too time-consuming for eliciting the 4000
probabilities. Neither did our experts appreciate direct
elicitation methods, such as a numerical scale with
labelled anchors, although these are easy to understand
and use and therefore less time-consuming. In this they
agree with many others who, except in situations where
the odds are objectively measurable, feel more at ease with
verbal probability expressions than with numbers (e.g.
[3,25-27]). For a detailed and comprehensive survey of
the large body of literature on the subject of verbal prob-
ability expressions, see [28], or [29]. Since our primary
interest was in fast and coherent elicitation, possibly later
to be followed by more fine-grained assessments where
necessary, we set out to design a probability scale with ver-
bal labels as anchors to accommodate our experts, and
numerical labels to inform the experts how their assess-
ments would be translated to the point probabilities we
required for the specification of our Bayesian network. In
a later stage, we could use sensitivity analyses [30] to
determine which assessments possibly needed refinement
to ensure accurate behaviour of the final network.
Design of the scale
The design of the verbal-numerical probability scale is
described in detail in [28]. Briefly: we conducted four
studies to indirectly obtain a relation between verbal
expressions and numerical interpretations of these expres-
sions. Based on the results of these studies we constructed
the scale shown in Figure 1a. It is a continuous scale, to
allow subjects to indicate any degree of probability. In
addition, the verbal probability labels are not placed in
alignment with the numerical anchors, since the verbal
expressions should not be taken to be in one-to-one cor-
respondence with particular numbers, but rather as a set
of labels with a stable rank-ordering, covering the whole
probability continuum.
With this elicitation method, which included the verbal-
numerical probability scale, the experts involved were
able to give their assessments at a rate of 150 to 175 per
hour. The experts indicated that they found the presence
of both numerical and verbal labels next to the scale quite
helpful. They had used words as well as numbers when
thinking about their assessments, depending on how
familiar they had felt with the situation to be assessed: the
more uncertain they had felt, the more they had been
inclined to think in verbal terms.
This study
The aim of the current study was to extend our findings to
a more realistic setting, with experts assessing probabili-
ties for situations they encounter on a daily basis. We used
three different probability response scales: 1) our 'double'
verbal-numerical response scale; 2) a 'numerical' scale
with numerical labels only, the labels being the same as
the numerical labels on the double scale; and 3) a 'verbal'
scale with only the verbal labels taken from the double
scale (see Figure 1a, b and 1c). Using a within-subject
design, we sought to provide an answer to the following
questions: 1. which scale do GPs prefer?; 2. does the type
of scale affect GPs' assessments and their confidence in
these assessments?; and 3. does the type of scale influence
unpacking effects?
The fact that people have been found to prefer the use of
words to convey uncertainty was one of the reasons for us
to include verbal labels on our probability response scale.
As this observation also holds for physicians (see e.g.
[3,26,27]) and is conform the observations from our first
evaluation study, we predict that our subjects prefer the
double scale to the numerical scale. We included a verbal
scale in this study for the sake of completeness, but we
expect that that particular scale gives the subjects too little
to go by. For this same reason we predict that the assess-
ments given on the verbal scale will differ from those
given on the double scale or the numerical scale, but that
the vagueness provided by the verbal scale will increase
the subjects' confidence in their assessments. Given our
previous experiences, we expect no difference in assess-
ments between the double scale and the numerical scale,
but do expect more confident assessments with the dou-
ble scale. To the best of our knowledge, the studies that
reveal the unpacking effect (e.g. [6,7,31]) have asked sub-
jects to give probability assessments without providing
any support. We expect that the use of a probability
response scale as supporting tool will not take away the
unpacking effect, but hopefully the effect will be
decreased.
Methods
Participants
We purchased, from an institute for primary care, a list of
300 randomly selected addresses of Dutch practising Gen-
eral Practitioners (GPs). We sent these GPs a letter intro-
ducing our study and the request to participate, together
with a questionnaire and a stamped return envelope. We
did not offer any payment. We reassured the GPs that their
answers would be analysed anonymously.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:13 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/13
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Materials
Vignettes
We prepared 15 descriptions of common medical situa-
tions, each accompanied by probability questions con-
cerning diagnostic, prognostic, or therapeutic alternatives.
These vignettes were reviewed by two very experienced
GPs (more than 20 years in practice), who judged their
familiarity and plausibility.
The first three vignettes required the assessment of proba-
bilities for alternative, mutually exclusive and exhaustive,
diagnoses. We will refer to these as the multiple diagnoses
vignettes. Each of these three multiple diagnoses vignettes
had two versions, a short version and a long version (see
Additional file 1, first three vignettes). The short version
asked for the assessment of probabilities for two alterna-
tive diagnoses and the option 'other'; in the long,
unpacked version, this 'other' option was replaced by
three additional diagnoses plus the option 'other'. This
manipulation is similar to the one used in fault tree stud-
ies in the area of analysing the fallibility of complex sys-
tems (cf. [32]), but has fixed options to study possible
unpacking effects. Each vignette described a medical situ-
ation followed by the question: "Given that the patient
has only one of the following illnesses, how likely do you
think that illness is?", after which followed either the
short or the long list of options. The remaining twelve
vignettes each required the assessment of only a single
probability (see Additional file 1, vignettes 4 through 15).
We will refer to these as the simple vignettes. They con-
cerned daily encountered medical situations together with
probability assessment questions.
Each vignette displayed one of the three probability
response scales for each probability to be assessed, that is,
3 or 6 scales for each of the multiple diagnoses vignettes
and 1 scale for each simple vignette. Only one type of
scale was used per vignette, the verbal, numerical or dou-
ble type, depending on the version of the questionnaire.
Questionnaires
Each questionnaire started with the three multiple diag-
noses vignettes, displaying a different type of response
scale with each vignette. We rotated presentation order of
the scales to counteract order effects, thus one third of the
GPs assessed the first vignette on a verbal scale, one third
started with a double scale and one third with the numer-
ical scale. Observing that there are six possible combina-
tions of the short and long versions of the three multiple
diagnoses vignettes (excluding combinations of only
short versions, or only long versions), we thus arrived at
18 different versions of the questionnaire for the first
three vignettes. Each of these versions in addition con-
tained the 12 simple vignettes, four with the verbal scale,
four with the numerical scale and four with the double
scale, again rotating presentation order in the different
versions.
Immediately below the first vignette on page one of the
questionnaire, we presented the statement "This scale was
very usable for indicating my assessment"; with yes, unde-
cided or no as response options. This question enabled us
to establish a primary reaction to usefulness of the scale,
not influenced by having seen the other scales. Moreover,
since different groups of GPs were presented with differ-
ent scales first, we were able to compare these initial eval-
uations between subjects.
For each of the 15 vignettes we included a question about
the GP's confidence in his/her probability assessment(s).
Confidence was to be indicated on a horizontal line with
complete/100% at one end and no/0% at the other.
On the final page of the questionnaire we printed the
question: "If you were asked to assess another 500 situa-
tions similar to the ones you just assessed, which scale
would you prefer to use?", where participants could tick
verbal, verbal plus numerical, or numerical. We left room
for remarks, and asked for their gender, year of birth and
years of practice as GP.
Data preparation
All probability and confidence assessments were meas-
ured with a ruler, anchored at 0 at the lowest and 100 at
the highest point. For the three multiple diagnoses
vignettes, the short lists (packed version) each contain
two alternative diagnoses, and the option 'other'; we will
denote these options by A, B, and O. In the long lists, the
first two diagnoses were exactly the same as the first two
in the short lists: A and B. The four remaining options in
the long lists should therefore together be equally proba-
ble as the option 'other' of the short lists. For our analyses,
we sum the probability assessments for these latter four
options from the long lists and take that sum as the assess-
ment for the compound option O in the unpacked ver-
sion.
Results
Participants
Eight questionnaires were returned uncompleted, either
because the addressee had moved (4) or because the GP
did not have the time or motivation to participate (4).
After four weeks and a reminder, we had received 86 com-
pleted questionnaires: a response rate of 29%. For the
returned questionnaires we found close to equal numbers
of respondents per version.
Of the 86 GPs who responded, 27 were women, 57 were
men and two GPs had not given their gender. The women
had a mean age of 47 years (SD = 7.3) and the men of 50BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:13 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/13
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years (SD = 6.9). The men had a mean of 19 years (SD =
8.4) of practice as a GP, and the women 15 years (SD =
7.4).
Usability and preference
As indicated on the first page of the questionnaire, i.e.
after they had assessed one multiple diagnoses vignette
with one of the three scales, every participant thought
their scale was quite usable, whether it was the verbal
scale, the double, or the numerical scale (70, 73 and 74%
'yes' answers to the usability question for the three scales,
respectively). We checked whether this appreciation of the
scale presented first biased participants in their ultimate
preference: would participants who had started out with
one scale like that scale most in the end, as indicated on
the last page in answer to the question which scale they
would prefer to use if they were asked to assess another
500 situations? Table 1 shows that this was not the case
(χ2(6) = 9.511, p = .147). Thus the first scale used did not
bias preferences. Table 1 also shows that there was no gen-
eral preference for one of the three scales as indicated on
this final question: the verbal scale was preferred by 20
participants, 26 participants preferred the double scale
and 34 participants the numerical scale. These preferences
did not differ significantly (χ2(2) = 3.7, p = .157). Gender
did not affect preference either (χ2(2) = .965, p = .617).
We did find differences when we took years of experience
of the participant into account. We divided the GPs in
four almost equally sized experience-groups. As shown in
Table 2, the differences in preference were significant
(χ2(6) = 14.856, p = .021). The least experienced group
preferred words, the middle groups preferred the double
scale, and the most experienced GPs preferred numbers.
Probability and confidence assessments
We analysed the relations between probability assess-
ments and scale type for the twelve simple vignettes. We
found that for none of the twelve vignettes did the type of
scale used result in significantly different assessments, see
Table 3. Neither was there a trend for assessments to be
consistently higher or lower on one scale than on the
other scales.
For the simple vignettes, confidence was generally quite
high, ranging from a mean of 72 to 89, with SDs between
12 and 20, see Table 3. They were nowhere significantly
different from each other for the same vignette with the
different scales.
Agreement among GPs both in their probability ratings
and in their confidence ratings for the twelve vignettes was
significant, but not impressive: Kendall's coefficient for
concordance had the value W = .52 for the probability rat-
ings, and only W = .24 for the confidence ratings (in both
cases df = 11, p < .00).
We found that neither age nor experience nor gender was
related to the probability assessments or to the confidence
assessments with any of the three types of scale.
Subadditivity and unpacking effects
With the three multiple diagnoses vignettes, participants
had to assess probabilities for an entire distribution of
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, that is, per
vignette the assessed probabilities should sum to 100%.
In addition, the assessments for the options A, B and O in
the short, packed, versions should be equal to the respec-
tive assessments for the options A, B and the compound
O in the long, unpacked, version. There is subadditivity if
the estimates for options A, B and O add up to more than
100%. There is an unpacking effect if the probability
assessment for the compound option O in the long list is
higher than that for the O option in the short list.
We see subadditivity with all three multiple diagnoses
vignettes, and both with a short and with a long list of
options, regardless of the response scale used. For each
vignette a 2 (List: long or short) × 3 (Scale: verbal, double
or numerical) × 3 (Option A, B or O) ANOVA was per-
formed, with list and scale as between subjects factors and
option as within subject factor. These analyses showed
that with all vignettes there were significant differences
depending on whether the list was long or short (vignette
1: F(1,79) = 27.908, p = .000; vignette 2: F(1,78) = 39.272,
p = .000; vignette 3: F(1,78) = 48.316, p = .000). Thus sub-
additivity was significantly more apparent after unpack-
ing. We observe from Table 4 that the average assessments
Table 1: First and preferred scale: Number of participants with the first scale used and their preferred scale
Preference
first used verbal double numerical missing total
Verbal 6 15 11 1 33
D o u b l e 7 41 142 6
n u m e r i c a l 7 71 212 7
T o t a l 2 0 2 6 3 468 6BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:13 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/13
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given for the A and B options are comparable per response
scale and vignette. The difference in subadditivity between
the short and long versions is therefore purely due to
unpacking effects, resulting in a more substantial overesti-
mation of the probabilities assessed for the O option in
the long list than in the short list.
In addition, we found for only vignette 3 that the extent of
subadditivity due to unpacking significantly depended on
the scale used (F(2,78) = 2.84, p = .045). It was strongest
with the verbal scale and weakest for the numerical scale,
the double scale falling in between. For the other two
vignettes there was no interaction effect of scale and
option.
Discussion
Which scale do GPs prefer?
The answer to this first research question is that altogether
the GPs in our study were not partial to any scale. We did
find that less experienced GPs preferred words, and more
experienced GPs favoured numbers. This is in line with
the observations made by the experts whose probability
assessments we elicited for the oesophagus network (see
above), that people who are less knowledgeable about
(part of) a domain and thus more uncertain, prefer to use
words to express this uncertainty, rather than numbers
with their seemingly precise meaning.
Does the type of scale affect GPs' assessments and 
confidence?
We found that the type of scale used did not seem to affect
the probability and confidence assessments. Confidence
was generally found to be quite high. Although this study
was not designed to test accuracy of assessments, the
agreement between GPs in probability assessments over
the three scales, suggests that the type of scale used will
not affect the accuracy. This is in line with our previous
findings (see [17]).
Does the type of scale influence unpacking effects?
As all our multiple diagnoses vignettes included more
than two hypotheses, it is not surprising that subadditivity
was found to be a general phenomenon [6]. The extent of
additional subadditivity due to unpacking did not, in gen-
eral, seem to depend on the scale used. From our analyses
for vignette 3, however, we conclude that use of the verbal
response scale involves a risk of significantly more overes-
timation upon unpacking.
Table 3: Probability and confidence: Mean probability and confidence assessments (plus standard deviations) for the simple vignettes, 
per scale type
probability Confidence
Vignette verbal double numerical verbal double numerical
4 69 (16.7) 65 (20.0) 74 (18.3) 82 (12.2) 83 (12.5) 81 (17.2)
5 40 (22.5) 47 (22.3) 41 (23.2) 63 (22.9) 73 (21.5) 68 (21.1)
6 58 (27.2) 69 (22.3) 66 (18.2) 83 (11.5) 80 (14.9) 72 (21.0)
7 42 (21.6) 42 (17.4) 44 (21.5) 78 (13.4) 77 (17.2) 76 (18.7)
8 54 (22.1) 44 (22.0) 41 (21.4) 80 (16.9) 74 (24.1) 76 (18.1)
9 15 (7.0) 17 (10.5) 14 (12.2) 89 (5.8) 86 (14.2) 89 (7.5)
10 32 (19.6) 35 (19.0) 34 (20.4) 82 (14.8) 77 (14.6) 77 (16.0)
11 49 (19.3) 46 (21.0) 41 (20.8) 76 (18.5) 76 (15.4) 72 (19.4)
12 40 (17.5) 43 (21.5) 40 (21.8) 81 (12.9) 82 (15.0) 76 (15.4)
13 80 (24.2) 72 (23.9) 76 (24.8) 88 (14.2) 80 (24.4) 86 (14.4)
14 90 (16.9) 94 (7.2) 85 (22.4) 92 (10.7) 93 (9.4) 92 (8.0)
15 57 (33.1) 62 (28.7) 76 (18.9) 87 (12.1) 88 (12.5) 89 (11.6)
Table 2: Experience and preference: Numbers of participants per experience-group who stated a preference (n = 80), and their 
preferred scale
Preference
years of experience verbal double numerical total
2–11 11 5 6 22
12–18 5 10 9 24
19–25 0 7 10 17
26–30 4 4 9 17
T o t a l 2 02 63 48 0BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:13 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/13
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We can compare our results for vignette 1 to those given
by Redelmeier et al's subjects (in [6]) to this same
vignette. Our subjects overestimated the option O in the
long list much more (mean of 123) than Redelmeier's
(mean of 69; see [6]). Although their subjects still showed
unpacking effects (option O's assessment increased from
50 in the packed version to 69 in the unpacked version),
possibly Redelmeier's exhortation to make sure that the
estimates add up to no more than 100% was stronger than
our implicit statement that the options were mutually
exclusive and exhaustive: "Given that the patient has only
one of the following illnesses...". Indeed, if we rescale the
assessments we found to a 0%–100% scale, we find the
same mean assessments as Redelmeier et al.
Although our results show that in general it does not mat-
ter which of the three response scales is used whenever a
probability response scale is chosen as supporting tool,
remarks made indicate that individual preferences do
exist. Subjects who preferred the verbal scale, said for
example: "I feel more at ease with words; I don't really
work with numerical assessments myself", and "I can't do
much with numbers; words are much more meaningful to
me". Also: "I feel the numbers force me to give a more pre-
cise answer, it's more gradual with words." Others, who
preferred the numerical scale, remarked for example: "I
thought the words were disturbing.", "I would even prefer
a blank line."
Those with a preference for the numerical scale did see the
advantage of words, though: "As an introduction, it is
nicer to see words too, after that I don't look at them any-
more", as well as the disadvantages: "Words carry with
them a stronger suggestion that something is almost
impossible, while in practice you do have to take the pos-
sibility into account. I found I tended to go higher on the
scale." These and similar thoughts about the conse-
quences made them prefer numbers: "Words are more
exact for me, but take longer and are more difficult to
process, I think." It is interesting that another GP, who
also preferred numbers, said that "Numbers are more
exact and less dependent on subjective interpretation." So
words are more exact to some, and numbers are more
exact to others.
Conclusion
We conclude that the different types of probability scale
are equally suitable for supporting probability assess-
ments. In addition, we advise that to counter subadditiv-
ity subjects should estimate the whole distribution of
options together, and it should be enforced that the esti-
mates add up to exactly 100%. To diminish unpacking
effects, options should describe well-defined events and
nothing vague like 'other'. We finally advise that the ver-
bal-numerical probability scale is a good option for aiding
probability assessment: it offers numerical labels to those
who prefer numbers and verbal labels to those who prefer
words, thus accommodating both more and less experi-
enced professionals in both more and less uncertain situ-
ations. The double scale may also serve well in the
communication of probabilistic information and risks,
e.g. by doctors to patients. Since people differ in their pref-
erences for verbal or numerical terms but are willing to
use both [33], the double scale might be the tool to give
an on-the-spot translation of words into numbers and
vice versa.
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numerical 30 (22.4) 26 (20.4) 81 (9.6) 80 (10.7) 21 (14.5) 26 (15.1)
total 31 (20.1) 29 (17.4) 79 (21.1) 78 (18.8) 22 (13.4) 28 (15.8)
verbal 63 (22.4) 121 (36.3) 32 (17.7) 96 (25.3) 46 (29.3) 128 (50.4)
O double 76 (15.2) 130 (39.0) 37 (26.8) 85 (31.4) 39 (23.7) 108 (38.9)
numerical 63 (12.9) 117 (53.5) 28 (26.6) 74 (66.0) 30 (24.6) 88 (60.2)
total 66 (16.3) 123 (41.7) 33 (24.2) 84 (43.2) 37 (26.1) 112 (50.6)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:13 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/13
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the study, performed the statistical analyses and took care
of the final formatting of the manuscript. All authors read
and approved the final manuscript.
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